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Scientific controversies have long excited both the
passions of participants and the interest of social
scientists [1]. For researchers into the nature of science,
controversies have the advantage that social processes
normally hidden in laboratories and offices are brought
into open view in a dramatic fashion. Assumptions that
are normally implicit are challenged by disputants,
routine procedures scrutinized and weak points in
arguments attacked. The disadvantage of studying
controversies is that it may give an unrealistic picture
of the day-to-day operations of normal science (Mulkay
et al. 1983). In any case, controversy analysis is a
thriving field of study, no doubt due, in part, to the
human drama and social implications associated with
many controversies.
The traditional social science approach to scientific
controversies has been to study the social dynamics of
science, assuming that there is a scientific truth
underlying the debate. Usually one side is believed to
be much closer to this core truth, and the task of the
social scientist then becomes one of explaining why the
other side persists in its claims. The social scientist
usually accepts the judgment of the most authoritative
scientists about scientific realities.
This positivist approach, a "sociology of scientific
error", has been challenged by relativist analysts of
science. In the strong program in the sociology of
scientific knowledge, the analyst is enjoined to treat
competing truth claims symmetrically (Bloor 1976).
Instead of looking only at the side considered wrong by
scientific authorities, the knowledge claims on both
sides of the controversy are examined, and an attempt
is made to explain them using social categories [2]. The
relativist program differs from the traditional approach
in two major, related ways. First, the social analysis is
applied to scientific knowledge claims, as well as to
wider social dynamics. Second, both sides in the
controversy are examined using the same repertoire of
conceptual tools. This contrasts with the traditional
approach, in which scientific knowledge claims are
seldom scrutinized (that task is left to the scientists),
and social explanations are selectively applied to the
side without authoritative scientific backing. It should
be noted that relativism is a set of methodological
specifications. Relativists may (or may not) believe that
there is an underlying scientific truth. But for the
purposes of social analysis, they set the issue of truth
and falsity aside: it is not treated as relevant to the
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social investigation.
Under both positivist and relativist approaches, the
controversy is normally treated as something external
to the researcher. It is "out there": the social research
itself is not viewed as part of the controversy. It is this
pervasive assumption that is questioned in this paper.
Within the traditional positivist interpretation of
science, the role of researchers in relation to scientific
controversies appears to raise few methodological
problems. The conventional view is that social
researchers should be objective in their assessment of
social evidence. This usually implies that the social
researcher is not directly involved in the issue being
studied.
However, because positivists treat scientific knowledge
as different from other sorts of belief such as religion or
"public opinion", objectivity in relation to scientific
knowledge appears to mean, for the social scientist,
accepting received scientific facts and theories as the
truth. It can be argued that because science decides
which side is correct, it does not compromise the social
scientist's objectivity to become involved in support of
the correct side. Indeed, the social researcher may be
attracted to the controversy because of requests from
participants, or be drawn to it by a duty to support
truth against misguided opponents. Martin Gardner's
popular treatment Fads and Fallacies in the Name of
Science illustrates well the approach also adopted in
more scholarly treatments. From the point of view of
those on the other side, social scientists taking part in
this way are definitely "captives of controversy". From
these social scientists' own point of view, and that of
the side of scientific orthodoxy, they are simply
supporting truth against falsity and are not
compromised at all.
A relativist or social constructivist approach does not
necessarily raise dilemmas for social researchers either,
but for an entirely different reason. Within the strong
program, researchers study disputes "naturalistically",
and this requires their epistemological and social
neutrality. Social researchers, we are told, should not
grind an evaluative axe. If researchers are "captured"
by either side and become part of the debate, then they
are deemed to have failed to maintain a symmetrical
approach. It is this assumption within the relativist
perspective which is the main focus of our paper.
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A leading instance of alleged "capturing" in relativist
controversy analysis is the study by Collins and Pinch
of the dispute over the existence of psychic phenomena.
Their paper, "The Construction of the Paranormal:
Nothing Unscientific is Happening", analyzes the
tactics used by both parapsychologists and orthodox
scientists in the course of the controversy. According to
Collins and Pinch, "controversy highlights social
processes with particular clarity" (Collins and Pinch
1979, 238), and the study of the social processes
involved in these attempts to legitimate parapsychology
also provides insights into the maintenance of the
dominant scientific culture.
From the perspective of their relativist stance, Collins
and Pinch argue that the "actual existence" of the
paranormal phenomena is redundant and that their
position on the existence of the phenomena is neutral
(Collins and Pinch 1979, 262). However, in an added
note we learn that Collins and Pinch's paper has been
drawn into the debate and used to support the
parapsychologists' case. Parapsychologists commended
the paper, while critics of the field charged the authors
with "selective reporting" rather than scientific inquiry
(Collins and Pinch 1979, 263).
Defending themselves against these charges, Collins
and Pinch claim they are "professional sociologists"
who are "disinterested in these questions" (Collins and
Pinch 1979, 263). This defence is not accepted by the
discourse analysts Mulkay, Potter and Yearley, who
sought to undermine the relativist analysis of
parapsychology by Collins and Pinch by alleging that
the latter were "in a disguised fashion, constructing
their analysis from the point of view of (some)
parapsychologists" (Mulkay et al. 1983, 187). That
partisans on both sides of the controversy saw Collins
and Pinch's analysis as favoring the parasychologists'
case is used by the discourse analysts to support their
criticism (Mulkay et al. 1983, 188). According to
Mulkay, Potter and Yearley, the reason for this lack of
social neutrality is that Collins and Pinch uncritically
adopted the parapsychologists' perspectives and
terminology.
This methodological demand for a separation between
researcher and researched may appear to work for
historical studies and for disputes contained within the
scientific community. In such cases the research
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subjects cannot, or may not want to, deploy the social
research in their struggles: historical subjects, being
dead, cannot bite back, and social scientists have little
perceived status in technical disputes between scientific
experts. But this convenient separation between
researcher and researched breaks down in current
controversies which involve matters of public policy or
some other strong link to the broader community. We
will use our own experiences in controversy analysis to
illustrate this claim. For convenience, each of the three
case studies is presented in the first person, though
each presentation has been shaped by our mutual
discussions and comments.

Pam Scott on the controversy
over the importation of live
foot-and mouth disease virus
into the Australian Animal
Health Laboratory
When I began my study into the establishment of the
Australian Animal Health Laboratory (AAHL), I knew
almost nothing about the topic apart from a few brief
newspaper reports. The establishment of the laboratory
was initially thought to provide a good case study for
looking at how government decisions about "big"
science and technology are made in Australia.
The idea that Australia needed a laboratory to diagnose
exotic animal diseases was raised in the late 1950s.
Investigations into the feasibility and desirability of
establishing such a facility were conducted at various
stages throughout the 1960s and 1970s by the
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research
Organization (CSIRO) and the Commonwealth (federal
government) Departments of Health and Primary
Industry, and these groups very actively lobbied for
support from the government. Government approval
was given for the AAHL in 1974; building commenced
in 1978 and was completed in 1985[3].
There was little public debate about the need to
establish a laboratory for diagnosing and studying
livestock diseases which, by the good fortune of
geographical isolation and the good management of
strict quarantine regulations, Australia had avoided.
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The reason for this lack of attention was that most of
the planning was not made public. Most citizens,
including farmers who had a particular interest in
animal health, were unaware of the plans to build the
laboratory and of its functions.
It was not until 1981 that farmers' interest was captured
when they learnt that CSIRO had sought and received
government approval to import live foot-and-mouth
disease virus into the laboratory when it was
completed. It should be understood that foot-andmouth disease is especially feared by farmers. It is
highly infectious, and an outbreak would result in the
immediate closure of Australia's export market for
meat and livestock, thereby costing the Australian
economy millions of dollars and ruining many farmers.
The controversy which developed over the importation
of the live virus contained a number of elements. First,
there was the debate on risk: some claimed there was
no risk from having the virus at AAHL; others (mainly
farmers) argued that any risk was unacceptable.
Structural security of the laboratory, the likelihood of
human error, and the consequences of not having the
live virus were all hotly debated. Then there was the
debate on the need to have live virus. Proponents
argued that the laboratory could not function
effectively without live virus, while opponents (who
included scientists) claimed live virus was not needed.
CSIRO, which was to administer the laboratory and
was its main advocate, unwittingly called into question
the need for the laboratory itself when some of its
scientists claimed that without live virus the facility
would be a "white elephant" (Scott 1989).
Laboratory proponents claimed that farmers' fears
were irrational and emotional and were fanned along
by a few scientists who feared their research budgets
would be adversely affected by AAHL's research
program. Opponents pointed to "empire-building" and
stubbornness as CSIRO's motivation. So the battle lines
were drawn and the debate raged for several years
(Scott 1988a).
I tried to keep clear of any active involvement in the
debate. I had no interest, involvement, or stake in the
outcome, and no expertise in veterinary health matters.
I intended to be dispassionate and objective in
reporting my findings, and I was confident that I could
maintain the necessary neutrality.

Page 6 of 27

Captives of controversy by Scott, Richards and Martin

My research began with the readily available public
documents on the laboratory, such as government and
parliamentary reports, but then I needed to go beyond
these public accounts of decision-making and talk to
the individuals involved. My first encounter was with
an "insider" opponent who provided me with a variety
of background materials and information about which
documents to request from the authorities. So to some
extent, I "entered" the debate via the opponents of the
laboratory.
My next major encounter was with CSIRO. This is the
organization responsible for administering and
operating the laboratory, and its most powerful and
prestigious advocate. When I met with members of the
CSIRO Executive to discuss obtaining access to CSIRO
files, their attitude was extremely defensive and
cautious. They agreed to give me access provided I
cleared anything I wrote on the subject with them. This
approval opened up vast quantities of material and
facilitated access to the files of other government
bodies.
While both sides supplied me with information, the
laboratory proponents did so reluctantly, perceiving my
interest as a threat to their already damaged
reputation, and whilst appearing cooperative, they were
anxious to maintain control over my work. The
laboratory opponents, on the other hand, were not
uniform in their views - some saw my work as exposing
the politics of CSIRO, some saw it as vindicating their
opposition, others hoped it would settle the issue - but
all thought it was important to reveal and record what
had happened.
My detailed documentation of the decision-making
process and the background to the controversy was not
meant to support one side or the other, to nominate
winners or losers, but to reveal the social processes
shaping the knowledge claims. The disputants
themselves, however, were not so sociologically
enlightened. They adopted a traditional positivist
stance. For them it was a conflict with a right and a
wrong side, with winners and losers. And my work was
incorporated into the debate.
The opponents of the laboratory were primarily
farmers and their organizations, but they also included
members of the public and some scientists, who were

Page 7 of 27

Captives of controversy by Scott, Richards and Martin

critical of what they perceived as an unnecessary,
costly, and high-risk enterprise. They had been labeled
by the laboratory proponents (who were primarily
veterinary scientists, CSIRO, and government
bureaucrats), as irrational, unscientific, emotional,
biased, and politically and economically motivated in
their actions. This depiction placed the opponents at a
considerable disadvantage in the context of the
proponents' claim to objective scientific authority. My
analysis corrected this imbalance by showing the nonscientific, value-laden, and politically-motivated basis
for the proponents' decision-making. Because this was
seen as undermining the proponents, I, like Collins and
Pinch, was perceived by both sides as favoring the
opponents.
The opponents of the laboratory described my work as
scholarly and well-documented. The proponents
claimed that it was a partisan presentation, that I had
started from a conclusion and then sought evidence to
support it, and that I wore blinkers. One of them called
one of my papers a "mischievous beat-up" and made
reference to "dung beetles digging in the droppings of
time". When I submitted work in progress to CSIRO it
was closely scrutinized and my interpretations and
conclusions were constantly challenged. On the other
hand, the laboratory opponents requested copies of my
papers, circulated them, and invited me to address
farmers' groups.
One of the effects of my research was to make available
information that was not widely known or had been
forgotten. Many participants did not know the
background to the establishment of the laboratory, and
even those involved in the decision-making did not
always have a complete picture of events. The
spreading of information and even the knowledge that
someone was actively researching the controversy
altered the debate. In other words, my very presence
changed what I was investigating.
Was I a bad researcher who was captured by the
laboratory opponents and seduced by their attention,
or was this the inevitable outcome of my research?

Brian Martin on the
fluoridation controversy
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The question of whether fluoride should be added to
public water supplies to reduce tooth decay has been
one of the most vociferously debated issues concerning
science and public policy over the past forty years. It
involves scientific issues, such as the assessment of the
effectiveness of fluoride in reducing tooth decay and
the status of claims of health risks, such as skeletal
fluorosis, allergic and intolerance reactions, and genetic
effects including cancer. It also involves ethical and
political issues, including the compulsion implicit in
adding a chemical to the water supply to treat the
individual, and the question of who should make
decisions about fluoridation. The issue has long been
highly polarized, scientifically and politically.
One of the reasons I undertook my study was my long
exposure to the issues through a colleague who is one of
the prominent scientist critics of fluoridation. But,
unlike the anti-fluoridationists, I have never been
passionately concerned about whether water supplies
are actually fluoridated. I regularly drank large
amounts of fluoridated water before becoming
acquainted with the controversy, and continue to do so.
My interest was and is in the politics of science as
revealed through the controversy.
One of my first tasks was to study earlier sociological
treatments of the fluoridation controversy. There have
been many dozens of these, and almost all of them use
a traditional positivist approach: fluoridation is
assumed to be scientifically correct, and there is little or
no discussion of the scientific evidence. Scientific
evidence raised by critics of fluoridation is almost
entirely unmentioned in these studies. The social
scientists have seen their task as one of determining the
reasons for the opposition to fluoridation. A range of
hypotheses have been studied: the demographic
characteristics of opponents have been studied
(opponents were found, in some studies, to be
disproportionately low in education, politically
conservative, and older); the opposition has been
explained by concepts such as irrationality, alienation
and confusion (Martin 1989).
A number of the social researchers reveal not only their
strong commitment to fluoridation but also the relation
of this commitment to their studies. The United States
Public Health Service, a leading force behind
fluoridation since 1950, invited Aaron Spector to study
the issue, and this led to the major project by Crain,
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Katz and Rosenthal (1969, v). These authors assume
that fluoridation is "progressive" and "rational" and
agonize over the political difficulty that many citizens
oppose it (1969, 227-228).
Many social scientists studying fluoridation have seen
their research as a source of insight and advice for the
proponents. For example, Kegeles (1961), in a
commentary on social science research on fluoridation,
concluded that "While future research will undoubtedly
continue to emphasize understanding rather than
action, there seems reason to be optimistic that help for
the [pro-fluoridation] practitioner will be one of the
eventual by-products." Gamson (1965) wrote on "How
to lose a fluoridation referendum", giving counsel to
proponents on what they should not do.
Twenty years later, the quest for social science
understanding useful to proponents continues.
Hastreiter (1983) tried to combine several different
social science perspectives: "Only by using a broad
spectrum of behavioral social science analyses can the
complex process of fluoridation conflict be
conceptualized and ameliorated." (490). There is not a
clear boundary between social science research and
what can be called "campaigning literature". Isman's
(1981) "Fluoridation: strategies for success" is a good
example. Isman draws on both social science studies
and practical experience in drawing up
recommendations for successful fluoridation
campaigns.
As noted earlier, some would argue that there is no
contradiction involved in partisan social research if it is
assumed that one side in the controversy is supported
by scientific truth. Indeed, participation in the
controversy on this particular side may be considered a
moral imperative. Gamson (1961, 54) concludes that
"Those who believe that truth needs no advocate need
only witness a few of the more heated fluoridation
controversies." Hastreiter (1983, 486) states that "as a
lesson in sociopolitical interaction, the failure to
achieve universal water fluoridation is a demonstration
of humanity's tenuous ability to apply the knowledge of
proved, cost-effective disease prevention to everyone's
benefit." Such quotations abound in the field [4].
Unlike most of these previous researchers, I undertook
my study with the intention of using the tools of
relativist analysis. Obtaining and studying both the
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scientific and sociological literature on fluoridation
through standard sources, literature searches and so
on, presented no apparent methodological problems. It
was when interacting with fluoridation partisans that
the stance of symmetry became increasingly difficult.
My social interaction with partisans in the controversy
began with letters to people outside Australia who had
been involved in the debate. Out of letters to 51
individuals in 11 countries over several years, I received
replies to 36. There was not much difference between
the response rates for known proponents and
opponents of fluoridation. But some of the opponents
were much more energetic correspondents than any of
the proponents, plying me with numerous articles,
names of people to contact, references and comments.
No pro-fluoridationist did the same. This differential
response was bound to affect my writing: I was aware
of materials, such as personal correspondence, most of
which had been supplied by anti-fluoridationists.
As part of my study, I interviewed 11 leading
proponents and 6 leading opponents of fluoridation in
Australia, most of whom were scientists, dentists, or
doctors. Only a few of these knew of me and my work
before the interviews. Most of them were forthright and
helpful. But it soon became clear that my minor role in
the controversy had preceded me.
Professor Elsdon Storey at the University of Melbourne
told me, after an hour or so of our interview, that he
knew what I was going to conclude in my study: he had
seen a report of a talk of mine on suppression of
dissent, in which I referred to cases of suppression of
scientist opponents of fluoridation. He demanded that
anything I wrote which mentioned him be shown to
him in entirety before being seen by anyone else.
I subsequently received a letter from another senior
academic proponent of fluoridation, Professor Jack
Martin [5], also requesting that he not be quoted in any
way without first approving the entire article. I inferred
that he had talked to Storey after my interviews with
them both. After I had prepared a draft paper called
"Coherency of viewpoints among fluoridation
partisans" (later published as Martin 1988a), I sent
copies to all interviewees for their comments. I
designed the text so that I did not refer directly to the
contents of the interviews with Storey and Martin, only
noting the existence of the interviews and referring to a
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published letter by Storey. I received comments from 5
of the 6 opponents interviewed, including some quite
critical ones. The only proponent responses were from
Storey, who said he did not want to be associated with
my article in any way, and Martin, who requested that
he not be mentioned in the article, not even in the list
of interviewees (a request which I declined).
Clearly, this was a very one-sided response to my work.
It was not unexpected, since my symmetrical analysis
of the controversy meant that the anti-fluoridationists
were given much more credence than is usually the case
in the standard scientific or sociological literature. The
effect was to isolate me from further insights into profluoridation thinking (except through the literature),
while keeping channels open to anti-fluoridation
thinking.
Later, I organized my material into a book and tried to
obtain critical comments on the manuscript from both
proponents and opponents. The three opponents I
approached each readily provided significant
comments on the draft, but obtaining comments from
proponents was a more difficult task. I received
comments from only 4 of the 12 international
proponents of fluoridation I approached. These
responses were invaluable: without them, it would have
been far harder to obtain a good picture of the
proponent case, and even easier to be drawn into the
camp of the opponents.
When my papers appeared in Metascience, Social
Studies of Science and Sociological Quarterly, the
fluoridation opponents circulated copies of them. The
work was useful to their cause. In one case, a leading
British opponent made my papers the subject of a
couple of his newsletters (although to some extent for
the purposes of criticism).
The fluoridation controversy is so highly polarized that
any analysis that is not strongly pro-fluoridation is seen
as anti-fluoridation. In this context, many proponents
apparently saw me as an opponent as soon as they saw
the type of symmetrical analysis I was undertaking.
Therefore, in one sense there was not a lot of effort
required to "capture" me to the anti-fluoridation cause.
Nevertheless, a number of anti-fluoridationists were
quite critical of some of my statements. The most
common criticism from both sides was that I hadn't
given enough credence to the overwhelming body of
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science that supported their case. The trouble was that
the two sides differed so completely about how the
science was to be interpreted!
My experiences cannot be attributed specifically to
adopting a relativist framework. Similar problems beset
positivists who give less than complete support to the
orthodox scientific position. Mazur's (1973, 1981)
classic paper "Disputes between experts" analyzed the
rhetoric of both proponents and opponents of
fluoridation, as well as partisans in the controversy
over low-level ionizing radiation. Mazur's article has
been highly cited in the general social science
literature, but it has seldom been mentioned by profluoridation social analysts.
Edward Groth III (1973) studied fluoridation in the
early 1970s as an issue of public policy. He examined
the scientific evidence and arguments on both sides in
considerable detail. Groth was not interested in
supporting or opposing fluoridation, but his intended
"neutral" position was not seen this way by partisans.
Opponents eagerly supplied him with information;
proponents tried to discredit him personally and
portray him as an anti-fluoridationist. Groth avoided
being a "captive of controversy" only by getting out of
the area (Groth 1988).
Groth did not use a relativist conceptual framework,
but his adoption of a "neutral", critical-of-all-claims
stance served as a de facto relativism. Many of Groth's
experiences were forerunners of my own. The stance of
relativist symmetry seems to provide no special
mechanism for avoiding de facto partisanship.

Evelleen Richards on the
vitamin C and cancer
controversy
The vitamin C and cancer controversy centers on the
attempt by Linus Pauling (Nobel laureate and wellknown anti-war activist and advocate of vitamin C as
both preventative and therapy for the common cold)
and Ewan Cameron (a Scottish surgeon) to
theoretically elaborate and demonstrate their claim
that vitamin C megadose can control or palliate cancer.
It is a well polarized controversy that has spilled over
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into the popular press. Pauling and Cameron apart, the
interested parties include the "cancer establishment",
various influential medical and scientific journals, the
medical profession as a whole, nutritionists,
megavitamin therapists, the holistic health movement,
the health food industry, the pharmaceutical industry,
and the many tens of thousands of cancer patients who,
largely as a result of Pauling's and Cameron's wellpublicized claims, currently take large daily doses of
vitamin C. The dispute has become particularly intense
over the claims and counterclaims surrounding the two
negative clinical trials of vitamin C carried out by
leading American oncologists at the Mayo Clinic in
1979 and 1985 [6].
The literature on medical controversies is dominated by
the standard positivist assumption that even the most
protracted and rancorous conflicts may be resolved by
the application of the scientific method to medicine in
the form of the rigorously designed and properly
applied controlled clinical trial (Lasagna, 1980; Doyle
1983). In the case of disputes involving alternative or
marginal therapies, analysts generally have uncritically
adopted the orthodox "scientific" medical position.
They focus almost exclusively on the "unscientific",
"irrational" or "unproven" claims of the alternatives,
and perceive their analytical task in terms of explaining
the popular "mistaken" or "credulous" adherence to
such scientifically unproven or unjustifiable therapies.
The most partisan of these analysts are committed to
the exposure of "quacks" and "charlatans", and their
studies have been incorporated into the anti-quackery
crusades of orthodox organizations such as the
American Medical Association and the American
Cancer Society (for example, Young 1967, 1972;
Holland 1982) [7].
There is little in the literature on contemporary medical
disputes, particularly those involving alternative
therapies, that is consistent with a relativist
epistemology. The more sociologically informed
analyses by Petersen and Markle (1979a,b; Markle and
Petersen, 1980) of the laetrile controversy avoided
espousing the orthodox cause. They claimed a "causal,
impartial and symmetrical" approach (1979b, 159). But
their analyses still lent themselves to the standard view
that the facts about disease and its treatment may be
objectively determined, and that it is their
interpretation from divergent social, political and
ideological frameworks that accounts for the polarized

Page 14 of 27

Captives of controversy by Scott, Richards and Martin

positions of the disputants and the lack of scientific
resolution of the dispute. Their persistent demarcation
of facts from values, their emphasis on the overtly
expansionist "political" tactics of the laetrile
proponents as opposed to the delimiting "scientific"
tactics of their orthodox opponents, the care with which
they dissociated their "equal time" treatment of both
sides from any suggestion that "both sides have similar
legitimacy" (1979b, 159), led to their de facto capture by
orthodoxy. Petersen's and Markle's accounts of the
laetrile proponents became a resource for the American
Cancer Society's (ACS) "Unproven Methods" list (1987),
and for such a notable "quackbuster" as William Jarvis
in the ACS-endorsed "professional education
publication", "Helping Your Patients Deal With
Questionable Cancer Treatments" (1986, 8) [8].
As with Brian's analysis of the fluoridation debate, my
own attempts at a neutral relativist analysis of the
vitamin C and cancer controversy must be interpreted
in the context of the dearth of relativist accounts of
contemporary disputes over medical therapies. In this
context, a symmetrical analysis that does not
epistemologically privilege orthodox knowledge claims,
but deals evenhandedly with the claims of orthodox
oncologists and marginal therapists, is flying in the face
of all tradition. As I soon found, it invites the suspicion
and hostility of orthodoxy and the equally problematic
embraces of the unorthodox. My thorough grounding
in recent sociology of scientific knowledge had not
equipped me to deal with the unintended consequences
of my careful application of the interpretative tools of
relativist analysis.
I am a trained historian of science with a medical
background. I became interested in controversy
analysis primarily because I wanted a contemporary
string to my bow. In 1981, I cast around for a topic and
settled on the vitamin C controversy. I had read
Pauling's (1970) well-known Vitamin C and the
Common Cold, but I was not even aware that there was
a vitamin C and cancer controversy until I did some
preliminary reading in preparation for a research grant
application. I got the grant and began my study. I did
not at that stage take vitamin C, although I now do when I remember to!
I soon narrowed my study down to the cancer debate,
which I found the most sociologically interesting and
manageable. I decided on a social constructivist

Page 15 of 27

Captives of controversy by Scott, Richards and Martin

comparison of the medical evaluations of vitamin C
with those of 5-fluorouracil, a conventional but
contentious cytotoxic drug, and with the putative
wonder drug for cancer, interferon, that was then at the
height of its hype. I presented a first paper on this
comparison at our annual professional conference in
Melbourne. The difference between researching issues
on which the dust of history has safely settled and
topical disputes was brought home to me when I was
contacted by a reporter for a leading Australian
newspaper. He interviewed me, obtained a copy of my
paper, and published an article on my research (Anon.
1983). I was then deluged with letters from members of
the public (some of whom asked my advice about their
medication), and various alternative practitioners and
megavitamin entrepreneurs, all of whom interpreted
me as supporting a pro-vitamin C position. I was also
invited to write an article for an Australian alternative
health journal, which I declined, as I did not want to
jeopardize what I considered to be my neutral position.
The only orthodox professional response I received was
from a Sydney academic oncologist who had not seen
the newspaper article, but who had been given a copy of
my paper by one of his patients. This same oncologist
tried, without success, to interest some of his colleagues
in my analysis and to set up a clinical trial of vitamin C.
I next sent copies of my paper to Linus Pauling and also
to the leading oncologists at the Mayo Clinic who had
carried out what was at that stage the only orthodox
trial of vitamin C as a cancer treatment. This trial had
given negative results which were disputed by Pauling
and Ewan Cameron, who was collaborating with
Pauling on the clinical assessment of vitamin C for
terminal cancer patients. I had very cordial replies from
both Pauling and Cameron (who was by then Medical
Director of the Linus Pauling Institute at Palo Alto).
Pauling congratulated me on my "fine" paper and
offered a few criticisms of matters of detail and
interpretation. He also requested that I keep him
informed of its publication progress, as the Linus
Pauling Institute might want to purchase some reprints
for distribution. Cameron congratulated me for my
"very good understanding" of the machinations of the
cancer establishment and claimed, rather disturbingly,
that his interpretation so completely coincided with
mine, that he might have written my paper himself.
My Mayo Clinic correspondents were less encouraging.
One of them professed to find my study "intriguing"
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and thought that it had broadened his "keen awareness
relative to the impact of socioeconomic factors on
cancer therapies". The other was Charles Moertel,
nationally famous (or infamous if you prefer) for his
recent demolition of laetrile as a cancer treatment as
well as of vitamin C. Moertel pulled no punches in
attempting to exercise his cognitive and social authority
over this upstart from Australia. While he thought that
the first part of my analysis was written with admirable
style and considerable objectivity, he claimed that the
second part of my paper (where I dealt with orthodox
cancer research and treatment) had degenerated into a
diatribe against the scientific conduct of medical
practice and an endorsement of quacks and charlatans.
According to Moertel, I had misstated and distorted
facts and had quoted him out of context for the
purposes of emphasizing my own personal philosophy.
In other words, while he enjoyed reading my relativist
analysis of the socio-economic shaping of the case for
vitamin C, he condemned and rejected my analogous
analysis of orthodox American cancer practices.
Moertel claimed that my ringing defence of Linus
Pauling was biased and he demanded correction of this.
He concluded by stressing that he did not authorize my
quotation of any part of his letter. As I was not
prepared to rewrite my paper according to his
prescription, I interpreted this letter as effectively
blocking my access to this leading participant in the
controversy.
Up to this point I had relied on published papers and
accounts for my analysis, but in 1984, as a result of my
representations, Pauling and Cameron gave me access
to their personal correspondence. I used part of my
research grant to travel to the Linus Pauling Institute,
and, for several months, with only minimal
supervision, I ransacked their extensive files. These
contained a wealth of source material, including not
only hundreds of their letters to one another, but also
their correspondence with their leading professional
opponents in the dispute, with editors, research and
funding bodies, and their manuscripts and referee's
reports. I was given an office at the Institute for my
personal use, and unrestricted access to a photocopier.
As well, Pauling and Cameron made themselves
available for a number of lengthy separate interviews
on this and subsequent occasions.
By contrast, my attempts to gain access to their
orthodox opponents met with only limited success. The
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editor of the New England Journal of Medicine, which
published both negative trials of vitamin C but which
had consistently refused to publish Pauling's and
Cameron's papers, refused my request for an interview
on the grounds that he was "too busy". The Director of
the National Cancer Institute, who had engaged in an
extensive correspondence with Pauling over the
funding of vitamin C research and the interpretation of
the Mayo Clinic trials, was also too busy for interview.
He arranged for a stand-in who had had only limited
involvement in the controversy, and who gave me one
hour of his time and very guarded information and
opinion. My request for access to relevant NCI
documents was restricted to those that I already knew
of through my study of the Pauling files and could
specifically request. In short, I was forced to rely
primarily on the Pauling-Cameron files, and on
published material.
This has resulted in a systematic bias in the
documentation of the controversy, although this bias is
not necessarily to the advantage of the vitamin C
advocates. Perhaps its most significant implication is
that it lays open to the closest scrutiny the expressed
actions, beliefs and motivations of the supporters of
vitamin C, while leaving those of their opponents
undeclared except in so far as they are willing to
represent them to the other side or in published
accounts of their work. The main danger of this
situation is that the claims of those most closely
scrutinized may be perceived to be "biased" by the
revelation of the supposedly "non-scientific" factors
that have fed into their assumptions, procedures and
presentation of their work, while those of their
opponents remain relatively unscrutinized and,
perhaps, may be presumed freer of such contaminating
influences.
In spite of my best efforts to steer a prudent path
through the minefield of contemporary controversy
analysis, I have become an involuntary participant in
the dispute. I have not been able to dissociate myself
from being viewed by the vitamin C advocates as an ally
in their just struggle. Everything I write seems to
confirm them in this opinion.
In 1986 the British journal New Scientist published my
account of the recently concluded and problematic
second Mayo Clinic trial of vitamin C. Pauling had been
unable to secure publication of his criticisms of this
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trial in the mainstream medical or scientific literature,
so my account was an important vehicle for their
dissemination. As well, my New Scientist article was
picked up and summarized by the American
publication Medical Self-Care, and so made available
to the alternative network (Freer 1986). After this, I
found it possible to secure previously inaccessible and
restricted documents and letters via alternative moles
at the National Cancer Institute, the Office of
Technology Assessment, and even the Mayo Clinic.
When I recently returned to the Pauling Institute to
update my material, I found myself and my work
entering into Cameron's applications for NCI grants
and his ongoing publication negotiations with the
editor of the New England Journal of Medicine.
Pauling cites my work in his public lectures on the
Mayo Clinic "fraud", and refers his correspondents to it
and to me. My 1988 paper in Social Studies of Science
was viewed as a "scholarly" and "objective" account by
Pauling and Cameron. Although they have not always
agreed with my interpretation of events, I am regarded
at the Linus Pauling Institute as the "official unbiased
historian" of the dispute.
On the other hand, my attempts to elicit some response
to my work from orthodox American oncologists and
nutritionists have met with very little success. Nor, in
spite of my representations of their relevance to the
major forthcoming report on the evaluation of
unconventional cancer treatments, was I able to
interest the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment
(OTA) in my published analyses of the vitamin C and
cancer controversy. Vitamin C is featured in the OTA
revised draft report as the unconventional treatment to
have undergone the most complete orthodox testing.
The detailed discussion of the Mayo Clinic trials is
based on the OTA-commissioned report of Dr. Jack
Yetiv, the author of a book summarizing recent
scientific findings on popular nutritional practices
(Yetiv 1986) and a contributing editor to Nutrition
Forum, the leading popular journal devoted to the
exposure of nutritional quackery. In his book, Yetiv's
approach to the vitamin C controversy was the
standard positivist one: that vitamin C has been tested
in the two "carefully performed scientific studies"
carried out by the Mayo Clinic, and that "current
evidence clearly suggests that vitamin C has no role in
the treatment of cancer" (1986, 183-4). This same
partisan approach is evident in the section on vitamin C
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in the OTA draft report, which gives no coverage to the
Pauling-Cameron criticisms of the Mayo Clinic trials,
nor to my own work. As a result of my representations,
I was invited by the OTA to review this draft. My
submission opposes Yetiv's interpretation, and
disputes, on sociological grounds, the lack of symmetry
in the OTA draft report.
My position of neutral, symmetrical analysis has led
finally to my active intervention in the dispute. I can
only conclude, like Pam and Brian, that I too have been
"captured".

Implications
First, sociological studies of contemporary
controversies must be viewed as potential resources in
social struggles over scientific or technical knowledge
claims. Our experiences suggest that, more often than
controversy analysts care to acknowledge, the analyst
becomes a participant in what Latour and Woolgar
have very aptly described as the "fierce fight to
construct reality" (Latour and Woolgar, 1979). The
analyst is at the front lines of the battle. It is so easy to
be caught in the cross fire that many prefer to don
positivist camouflage and seek shelter in the bestfortified trench, rather than venture out into the noman's-land (which is even more a no-woman's-land) of
sustained symmetry. The combatants have a good deal
at stake in the sociologist's interpretation and
presentation of news from the war zone. Their
perceptions of what the analyst is up to, or rather, of
what the analyst should be up to, inevitably enter into
the reconstruction of the story. Both sides to a dispute
have opposing and unshakeable convictions as to who
are the heroes and the villains involved, and where
truth and justice lie. If they do not welcome the
analyst's attempt to deal symmetrically with the claims
of their opponents, they may withdraw their
cooperation or actively hinder the study. Alternatively,
one side may react more sympathetically to the
analysis, and attempt to win the analyst to their cause.
This leads us to our second conclusion: an
epistemologically symmetrical analysis of a controversy
is almost always more useful to the side with less
scientific credibility or cognitive authority. In other
words, epistemological symmetry often leads to social
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asymmetry or non-neutrality. The side with fewer
scientifically and/or socially credentialed resources is
more likely to attempt to enroll the researcher, whereas
the better credentialed side views an epistemologically
symmetrical analysis as threatening to their cognitive
and social authority, and they are more likely to react to
the analyst with hostility or suspicion. Each case we
have discussed has followed this pattern. We do not
consider our experiences to be unique. Without buying
into the boundary dispute between discourse analysts
and Bath relativists, we think that this is precisely what
happened to Collins and Pinch in their study of
parapsychology. Parapsychologists, who lacked the
sources of cognitive and social power available to
orthodox scientists, interpreted the symmetrical
analysis of Collins and Pinch as support for their cause
and deployed it in their struggle against the orthodox
scientists.
There is no reason to expect that discourse analysts are
exempt from this process. As argued by Doran (1989),
the discourse analysts are subject to the same problems
of reflexivity and recursion as the strong program
analysts they criticize. Discourse analysts certainly have
not shown how they might avoid being captives of
controversy.
Our third conclusion is that the intervention by the
analyst perturbs the dispute. Among other problems,
this may make it more difficult for the analyst or other
researchers to obtain access to participants and
documents. It is possible, we suggest, for the analyst's
"unwitting" intervention significantly to change the
course of the controversy.
So, methodological imperatives to the contrary, the
controversy analyst, wittingly or not, may become a
partisan participant in the debate. The view, raised to a
principle in relativist approaches to controversy
analysis, that social researchers must be neutral or
apolitical observers, requires radical reassessment. The
political role of the researcher must also be addressed
in any full-blooded controversy analysis. Our position
is that symmetrical analysis is an illusion: the
methodological claim of neutral social analysis is a
myth that can be no more sustained in actual practice
than can the scientist's belief in a universal and
efficacious scientific method. We think that an analytic
insistence on the political role of the analyst cuts
through the Gordian knot of the sterile reflexivity
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debate.
The irony of our analysis is that the guise of neutrality
is one of the best ways to be an effective partisan. The
positivist controversy analyst, employing a "sociology
of error", is an effective supporter of scientific
orthodoxy through stigmatizing its critics; the relativist
analyst, through ostensible symmetry, is an effective
supporter of the critics of orthodoxy by giving them
unusual credence. An active partisan who undertakes
either form of analysis has less credibility than an
apparently independent and neutral person. This is
precisely why partisans on one side point to the analyst,
as independent authority, as support for their cause,
while those on the other side try to paint the analyst as
not being independent.
Our analysis fits nicely into the framework of the "weak
program of the sociology of scientific knowledge" as
presented by Chubin and Restivo (1983). The weak
program does not distinguish between the controversy
and the analyst: the social scientist is automatically
part of the controversy. The implication is that the
analyst is more than a detached observer: the analyst
should be critically involved, in the role of citizen.
Although the weak program provides a theoretical
solution to the problem of the disjunction between
participants and analysts of controversies, it provides
no practical solution to the dilemmas posed by the
prospect of being a captive of controversy. The analyst
may employ a positivist analysis, a strong program
analysis, a weak program analysis, or whatever. But
that is simply the analyst's self-description. The (other)
controversy partisans are likely to ignore motivations
and methods and try to enroll, discredit, or otherwise
deal with the analyst as their interests dictate. The
implications of this for the study of controversies
remain to be fully assessed.

Footnotes
1 Some excellent surveys are Engelhardt and Caplan
(1987) and Nelkin (1979).
2 Key works in relativist controversy analysis include
Collins (1981; 1985), Pickering (1984) and Pinch
(1986).
3 For a full account of the history of the laboratory see
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Scott (1986), or for a shorter version Scott (1988b).
4 For a more detailed discussion see Martin
(forthcoming), where the relation between social
science work critical of fluoridation and participation in
the debate is also discussed.
5 No relation to Brian Martin.
6 For a detailed analysis of the vitamin C and cancer
dispute see Richards (1988 and forthcoming).
7 The most notable exception to such positivist
orthodox partisanship is Harris Coulter's (1973)
scholarly account of the historical conflict between
homeopathy and the American Medical Association.
Coulter mounted a stinging attack on orthodox drug
therapy and claimed that homeopathy was more
"scientific" than the former.
8 In their most recent account of the laetrile
controversy, Markle and Petersen (1987) are less
cautious in their dissection of the role of orthodoxy in
the conflict. It remains to be seen how this more critical
account is viewed by orthodoxy.
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